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1. Introduction 
 Undoubtedly owning one’s dwelling is not only a signal of personal success but 
also one of the most important ways of wealth accumulation. Hence, barriers to 
homeownership have traditionally been an important research and policy issue. 
Historically, in most of the developed economies there has been a wide range of 
public policies implemented so as to promote homeownership. These range from 
important tax deductions and generous subsidies for the less favored homebuyers to 
the public provision of affordable dwellings aimed to low-income households. 
However, the success of these policies is condition by scarce public resources and 
excess demand from the less favored population groups. Hence, affordable lending 
has also been a main focus in the mortgage markets in most of the developed 
economies. 
During the 1990s the mortgage industry has devoted a great effort to design 
mortgage products to facilitate the access to homeownership. These range from 
important innovations in affordable mortgage lending that reduces down payments 
to a minimum amount to mortgage payment protection insurance policies. The 
latter are specially aimed at mitigating the devastating effect that income 
uncertainty exerts on the homeownership propensities, though after with limited 
success (see e.g. Pryce and Keoghan, 2002, and Ford and Quilgars, 2001, in the 
UK, and Ross and Tootell, 2004, in the US). Given the lack of liquidity of home 
purchases and that financing the purchase of one’s dwelling entails undertaking a 
long lasting high level of indebtedness, income uncertainty becomes itself as 
important as the level of income when deciding the tenure status.  
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 Previous empirical literature on this issue observes an unequivocal negative 
effect of income uncertainty on the probability of homeownership. According to 
theoretical models, income uncertainty is expected to exert an effect on the tenure 
decisions after considering risk aversion, however, this assumption has never been 
empirically tested. In this paper we test for the first time whether the driving force 
behind the negative relationship between homeownership and income uncertainty 
is households’ aversion to the risk of a mortgage default or on the contrary it is 
driven by credit constraints. 
The relevance of carrying out such a test comes from the plausible conjecture 
that households with more volatile incomes might be also more credit constrained 
than household with steadier incomes. Disentangling this puzzle is critical in order 
to design public policies, improve affordability of lending, and develop more 
effective mortgage insurance policies aimed at promoting homeownership among 
those households most at income risk.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the 
literature analyzing the effect of income uncertainty and credit constraints on 
homeownership. Section 3 describes the data set and the empirical framework. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results, and section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Overview of the literature 
During the past decade the effects of income uncertainty on homeownership 
have received considerable attention by economists. However, theoretical models 
incorporating this effect systematically tend to provide ambiguous predictions; 
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income uncertainty is expected to exert a negative or non-negative effect depending 
on differences in the construction and the assumptions underlying each model. 
De Salvo and Eeckhoudt (1982) predicted a negative relationship between 
housing consumption and the probability of unemployment. Using a similar 
framework Turnbull et al. (1991) found that the relationship between income 
uncertainty and homeownership is generally negative, however, it might be non-
negative if the expected labor income entails compensating wage differentials for 
income risk. Fu (1995) analyzes the demand for housing under the presence of 
liquidity constraints. He shows that with increasing liquidity and high risk-aversion 
housing investment might fall with increasing income uncertainty, however, with 
constant risk-aversion and if investors do not increase liquidity this result could 
switch to a positive effect. 
Despite the ambiguity shown by theoretical models, there are some studies that 
explicitly test the effect of income uncertainty on the homeownership propensities 
and found an unequivocal negative effect. Haurin and Gill (1987), Haurin (1991) 
and Robst et al. (1999) report evidence based on US data, and Diaz-Serrano (2004) 
does for Spain and Germany.  
There is also an ample range of studies in the US analyzing the effect of credit 
constraints on homeownership. This literature starts with Linneman and Wachter 
(1989) who, using criteria based on mortgage requirements that set industry 
standards, built indicators reflecting the degree of household’s income and wealth 
constraints relative to home purchases. They observed a negative effect of credit 
constraints on the probability of homeownership.  
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Using a similar framework Haurin et al. (1997) observed that the home tenure 
choices among young American households are also quite sensible to credit 
constraints. Rosenthal (2002) proxy household’s credit constraints using direct 
responses to questions aimed at ascertaining whether the household had had any 
request for credit turned down or just partially granted. He also observed a lesser 
propensity for homeownership among credit constrained households. 
 Quercia et al. (2003) assessed the impact of affordable lending initiatives on 
homeownership rates. They observed a positive effect on homeownership but also 
noted that after controlling for borrowing constraints the impact is not the same 
across the less favored population groups. Barakova et al. (2003) studied the 
evolution of the effect borrowing constraints during the 1990’s. They conclude that 
wealth constraints have a larger negative effect than income constraints on 
homeownership, but also that this effect is decreasing over the last decade.  
Linneman et al. (1997) updated Linneman and Wachter and constructed a 
simulation model to measure the effect of policy changes governing constraints and 
mortgage interest rates on the aggregated rates of homeownership in the US. They 
also find wealth constraints to have a larger impact than income constraints. 
Bourassa (1995) is one of the few studies providing empirical evidence outside the 
US. He replicated Linneman and Wachter using Australian data and observed a 
negative effect of credit constraint on the homeownership propensities. 
 
3. Data, variables and empirical framework 
3.1. Data 
The data we use in our study comes from the Italian Survey of Household 
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Income and Wealth (SHIW). It is a panel survey (annual from 1977 to 1987 and 
biannual from 1989 to 2000) carried out by Banca d’Italia (Central Bank of Italy). 
The survey contains detailed information on household characteristics, 
employment, income, assets, financial habits, the type of home tenure and several 
questions regarding the homeownership and the borrowing conditions. 
Additionally, starting from 1995, the survey also includes rotatory questions 
addressed to the study of specific issues. For our purposes, the 1995 and 2000 
waves contain questions addressed to the household heads that allow us to 
construct a measure of individual risk aversion. We use the panel from 1986 to 
2000 to estimate income uncertainty and the waves corresponding to 1995, 1998 
and 2000 to evaluate credit quality constraints and to examine the determinants of 
the homeownership propensities.  
 
3.2. Owning/renting user costs 
 Owning and renting costs is a relevant variable when analyzing the housing 
tenure choices. In this paper this variable is used in the estimation of the probability 
of homeownership, but also to perform linear regressions on preferred housing 
values across Italian households.  We define the cost of owning relative to renting 
as 
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where Vk and Rk are the deflated average house values and annual rents in region k, 
respectively, r is the nominal mortgage rate, p is the property tax rate, m is the 
maintenance rate, and t is the marginal tax rate. In equation (1) the numerator 
specifically refers to the owner occupancy opportunity cost (Henderson and 
Ioannides, 1987). The cost of owning relative to renting is computed for each of the 
20 regions available in our data1. Deflated average house values for recent 
purchases, average annual rents, and average nominal mortgage interest rates are 
directly taken from our data set. In Italy, the property tax rate ranges from 3 percent 
for first time homebuyers to 7 percent, and the marginal tax rate is 19 percent up to 
the maximum amount of 3,615€. We use these values to estimate owning costs in 
equation (1). Following Robst et al. (1999) we assume a maintenance rate of 1.5 
percent. 
 
3.3. Measuring borrowing constraints 
 To measure to what extent a household is credit constrained we follow 
Linneman and Wachter (1989). Using their notation, the threshold house value that 
household i should aim in order not being income constrained (VI) and wealth 
constrained (VW) is:  
 
0.35 , 5I Wii i i
IV V W
r
= = ⋅ , (2) 
 
                                                 
1 These regions are Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino, Veneto, Friuli, Liguria, Emilia 
Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna. 
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where r is the mortgage interest rate, I is the annual household income, and W is 
the net household wealth. Since house values are only observed for homeowners, 
we use a subsample of unconstrained homeowners, those with observed house 
value lower 85 percent of both VI and VW, to estimate the following housing 
demand equation 
 
*
i i iV X uβ= + , (3) 
 
where V* is the preferred house value, X is a vector of household characteristics 
which also includes house preferences, β is a parameter vector to be estimated, and 
ui is a random error term. In a second stage we use βˆ  to impute a *iˆV  to each 
household either homeowner or renter. Hence, we assume that a household is 
income constrained (IC) or wealth constrained (WC) if *ˆ 0.9 Ii iV V> ⋅  or 
*ˆ 0.9 Wi iV V> ⋅ , respectively. 
Equation (3) is estimated using a pooled sample covering the waves 1995, 1998 
and 2000. Since using pooled data may lead to inefficient estimates we just select 
the last wave the household has participated. The explanatory variables (X) in 
equation (3) are a set of variables regarding the household, i.e. a squared 
polynomial on household income and the number of children; some characteristics 
of the household head, i.e. a squared polynomial on age, marital status and gender; 
a set of geographical dummies, i.e. region and city size; the costs of owning 
relative to renting and year dummies.  
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The linear estimation by OLS of the preferred housing value equation (3) is 
reported in table 1. Most of the variables considered are significant at 1 percent or 
better. Both the household income and the age of the household head show a 
positive but decreasing effect. Higher preferred house values are observed in the 
North-East of Italy and the Islands, and it is decreasing with the city size.  
 
Insert table 1 around here 
 
Additionally, our dataset also provides some questions that allow us directly 
measure borrowing constraints in the same way as in Rosenthal (2002). These 
questions are:  
 
C54. During the last 12 months did your household apply to a bank or a financial 
company for a loan or a mortgage? 
C55. Was the application granted in full, in part or rejected? 
C56. During the last 12 months did you or another member of your household 
consider the possibility of applying to a bank or a financial company for a 
loan or a mortgage but then change his/her mind thinking that the application 
would be rejected? 
 
 From answers to C54-C56 we create a dummy variable that takes 1 if the 
loan was denied, just partly granted, or if any member refrained from applying 
concerned of being turned down. We call this direct proxy of being credit 
constrained DCC. Additionally to IC and WC we also use DCC to examine the 
effect of credit constraints on the probability of homeownership. Table 2 shows a 
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summary statistics on IC, WC and DCC. As expected we observe that renters tend 
to be more credit constrained than homeowners. 
 
Insert table 2 around here 
 
3.4. Measuring income uncertainty 
Following Robst et al. (1999) income uncertainty is measured using the 
household head’s net annual labor income. Although housing purchases are mostly 
planned taking into account household’s income, there are several reasons to 
sustain that household head labor income would be more important than other 
sources of income in the housing tenure decisions2. Firstly, it is the main 
component of the household’s net disposable income. And secondly, it also tends 
to be steadier than other sources of income as e.g. wife’s income. Of course, it does 
not implies that wife’s income is not relevant, but variations in wife’s income has 
more to do with entries and exits in the labor market due to fertility, and tied-
mobility linked to their husbands. Therefore, income volatility for most  married 
woman has less to do with income risk coming from market forces. 
In Italy, in 1986 the share of the household head labor income in the overall 
household income was 70 percent and in 2000 this share was 60 percent. Hence, 
because of its more transitory nature, the remaining share of the household income 
composed by other members’ wages, assets or public subsidies are not considered 
when computing income uncertainty. Additionally, since our measure of risk-
                                                 
2 See Robst et al. (1999) for a more extensive discussion. 
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aversion can be computed only for the household heads it is convenient estimating 
labor income uncertainty just using the household head labor income.  
 To proxy labor income uncertainty we turn to the decomposition of income into 
a permanent and a transitory component. Variables affecting permanent labor 
income such as experience, education, gender or region are expected to generate 
systematic variations in income. These variations in permanent labor income are 
foreseeable by individuals, therefore, a suitable measure of income uncertainty 
should be purged of these systematic variations that have nothing to do with risk. 
We estimate a panel data regression on household head labor income as follows3 
 
ln( )it it i itw Z eγ α= + + , (4) 
 
where the subscripts i and t indexes households and time, respectively; ln(wit) is the 
natural logarithm of the household head net annual labor income; Zit is a set of 
explanatory variables referring to the household head; αi is an intrinsic individual 
time-constant shock in earnings, which is normally distributed; eit is a time-varying 
white-noise random shock in earnings; and γ is the set of parameters to be 
estimated. We estimate equation (4) using a panel data model with random effects 
(Hsiao,1986, Ch. 4) using the panel covering the period 1986-2000. The 
explanatory variables (Z) in equation (4) are years of schooling, a squared 
                                                 
3 Typically, transitory income and permanent income add up to equal total income. This property 
calls for a linear-linear specification of the labor income equation. However, since the log-linear 
specification provides a remarkably better fit, following Robst et al. (1999) we also chose the log-
linear specification. 
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polynomial on potential years of work experience, gender and a set of regional and 
city size dummies. 
One advantage of the labor income equation (4) is that it estimates the 
systematic component (αi) due to unobserved factors such as ability, effort, etc. 
Hence, transitory shocks in labor income (eit) can be netted out from this systematic 
component. Income uncertainty will be estimated using the time-varying 
component of the estimated residuals in equation (4) as follows: 
 
{ }22
1
1ˆ ˆ
T
ei it i
tT
σ η η
=
= −∑ , (5) 
 
where ˆ ˆexp( )it iteη = , iη  is the average over time of ˆitη  for each household and the 
exponential transformation is used in order to transfer back iˆte  to the money 
metric4.  
Table 1 shows the estimation of the labor income equation (4). All the 
explanatory variables are highly significant and have the expected signs. Table 3 
reports the level of income uncertainty for selected population groups. As expected, 
renters face, on average, about 42% more uncertainty than owners, 0.37 vs. 0.26, 
respectively. Labor income uncertainty is decreasing with age up to 50 years old 
for owners and increasing for renters. In wealthier regions (North), income 
uncertainty is markedly lower than in the poorer (South and Islands). In these 
                                                 
4 By definition we have 
1 1
1 0
n T
it
i t
e
nT = =
=∑∑ . However, since our measure of transitory income is just 
the average over time for each household we get that 
1
1 0, .
T
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t
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 12
regions the gap in income uncertainty between owners and renters is also larger. 
Moreover, for the rest of the household head characteristics the levels of income 
uncertainty display a reverse pattern between owner and renters. These results 
suggest that tenure choices might be strongly influenced by this variable. 
 
Table 3 around here 
 
3.5. Measuring risk aversion  
 Our measure of risk-aversion is based on individual responses to the following 
question:  
 
“You are offered the opportunity of acquiring a security permitting you, with the 
same probability, either to gain 10 million lire (≅ €5,200) or to lose all the capital 
invested. What is the most you are prepared to pay for this security?” 
 
Using a Taylor series approximation to the utility function Hartog et al. (2002) 
obtain the following approximate expression for the Arrow-Pratt measure of 
absolute risk aversion (ARA): 
 
2 2
( )
1 ( )
2
i
i
i i
Z PARA
P Z PZ
λ
λ λ
−= ⎡ ⎤+ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
(6)
 
where λ is the probability of wining this “lottery”, Z is the “prize” and P is the 
amount that individuals are willing to pay. According to expression (6) individuals 
who are willing to pay about 5 million lire (P≅€2,600) are assumed to be risk 
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neutral (ARA=0), bellow this amount individuals are assumed to be risk averse 
(ARA>0), and above this amount risk lovers (ARA<0). For maximum risk aversion 
(P=€0) we get ARA=2/Z, and for maximum risk loving (P≅€5,200) we get ARA=-
2/Z.  
In total 8,135 household heads answered this question in 1995 and 3,933 did so 
in 2000. This corresponds to 12,068 individuals, from who 950 participated in both 
waves. We show a summary statistics in table 4. The distribution of individual risk 
aversion in our sample report a similar distribution to that observed in Guiso and 
Paiella (2001) for Italy, and in Hartog et al. (2002) for The Netherlands, though 
Dutch tend to be more risk-averse than Italians. We find that in 1995 about 76.5 
percent of the respondents were risk-averse, about 17 percent were risk-neutral and 
about 6.5 percent were risk-lovers. However, in 2000 risk-aversion rose up to 92.4 
percent, and risk neutrality and risk loving felt up to 6.7 and 0.85 percent, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4 around here 
 
Measuring risk aversion based on hypothetical lottery games is often criticized. 
Some researchers doubt about whether such questions can be answered in a 
meaningful way, and whether the answers can really be correlated with real risk 
undertaking propensities (e.g. risk taken in portfolio investments). To deal with this 
criticism, we test the performance of our risk aversion measure (ARA) with two 
individual decisions that are assumed to be strongly dependent on the degree of risk 
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aversion. These are self-employment and investment in risky assets (bonds, shares 
and mutual funds overall household’s portfolio). Results are presented in table 5. 
 
Table 5 around here 
 
We use three different models to validate our ARA measure with the investment 
in risky assets. Firstly, a probit model where the endogenous variable is a dummy 
variable that takes 1 if the household holds risky assets in the portfolio. Secondly, a 
generalized linear model where the endogenous variable is the percentage of risky 
assets in the overall portfolio. And thirdly, a Tobit model on the total amount 
invested in risky assets with truncation at zero. In the case of self-employment we 
use a single probit specification. In all cases our measure of risk aversion shows a 
negative and highly significant effect (at 1 percent or better).   
 
3.6. Econometric model 
The observed endogenous variable in our econometric model, yi, is binary, 
taking the value one if the household i is homeowner and 0 otherwise. In this 
context, yi, is the realization of the unobserved propensity for homeownership for 
each household, y*i. Hence, the econometric specification can be written as  
 
* '( 0) ( 0) ( 1,..., )i i i iy I y I H i Nδ ν= > = + > = , (7) 
 
where I(•) is a binary indicator function that takes one if the argument is true and 
zero otherwise, Hi is a vector of explanatory variables, δ is the vector of 
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coefficients to be estimated, and νi is the error term.  If we expand equation (7) to 
consider the effect of both credit constraints (CC) and labor income uncertainty 
( 2iεσ ) as measured in expression (5) we have 
 
* ' 2ˆ( 0) ( 0) ( 1,..., )i i i i i iy I y I H CC i Nεδ λ σ π ν= > = + + + > = , (8) 
 
 From equation (8) we should expect λ<0 (e.g., Linneman and Wachter, 1989, 
Bourassa, 1995, Haurin et al., 1997, Rosenthal, 2002, and Barakova et al., 2003), 
and π<0 (Haurin, 1991, Robst et al., 1999, and Diaz-Serrano, 2004a). Estimates of 
the parameters in equation (8) coming from a single univariate probit model will 
be, however, inconsistent if νi and the error term of a potential binary equation 
where CCi is the endogenous variable are correlated (see Woolbridge 2002, p. 477). 
In this context, the bivariate probit model would provide consistent estimates.  
 As mentioned earlier, the main focus of the paper aims to test whether the effect 
of labor income uncertainty ( 2iεσ ) is driven by household’s risk-aversion (to e.g. a 
mortgage default) or on the contrary it is driven by household’s credit constraints 
(e.g. no access to the mortgage market). This test requires estimating equation (8) 
for different population groups; credit vs. non-credit constrained, and risk vs. non-
risk averse. The size and the significance of the estimated effects for π in equation 
(8) for each of these population groups will allow us disentangling the puzzle. As 
in Rosenthal (2002), the model consists of two equations and can be expressed as 
follows 
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* '
1 1 1 1 1( 0) ( 0) ( 1,..., )i i i iy I y I H i Nδ ν= > = + > =  
* ' 2
2 2 2 2 2 2ˆ( 0) ( 0) ( 1,..., )i i i i iy I y I H i Nεδ σ π ν= > = + + > =  
(9) 
 
where yi1* is the latent variable indicating the propensity to be or not credit 
constrained, or risk or non-risk averse, and yi2* is the latent indicator regarding the 
propensity for homeownership, where 1 2( , )i iν ν ~ (0,0,1,1, )BVN ρ . The matrixes H1i 
and H2i do not need to contain the same variables. The explanatory variables in the 
tenure choice equations (8) and (9) are a set of household head’s characteristics, i.e 
education, a squared polynomial on age, marital status, and self-employment; a set 
of household’s variables, i.e. size, number of dependent members (no income 
recipients), household income; a set of dummies collecting the credit situation 
(outstanding bank debts); a set of geographical dummies, i.e. regional dummies, 
city size and household’s location; and as our key variables we include labor 
income uncertainty and a set of dummies regarding credit constraints. However, 
since in the system of equations (9) the tenure choice equation is specifically 
estimated for credit or non-credit constraint households, dummies referring to 
credit constraints are dropped from this equation. 
In the system of equations (9) we face both a censoring and observation rule for 
both yi1 and yi2, which lead us to consider the sample selection issue. Hence, we 
need to control for correlation between the error terms and the sequence of 
“choices”. For each tenure outcome we have three types of observation: being 
(non-)credit constrained; being homeowner; and not being homeowner. 
Analogously, we can draw the same sequence in the case that the first latent 
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indicator (yi1*) refers to the propensity of being or not risk averse. The 
unconditional probabilities of this binary tree are given by: 
 
1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 1
( 1 1) ( , , )
( 1 0) ( , , )
( 0) 1 ( )
i i i i
i i i i
i i
P y y H H
P y y H H
P y H
δ δ ρ
δ δ ρ
δ
= = = Φ
= = = Φ − −
= = −Φ
∩
∩  (10)
 
where Φ and Φ2 denote the univariate and bivariate standard normal cumulative 
distribution functions, respectively. And, the resulting log-likelihood function is 
given by 
 
( )
1
2
1 1
2
2 1 1 2 2
1
1
2 1 1 2 2 1 1
1 0
0
log ( , , )
log ( , , ) log 1 ( ) ,
i
i
i i
i
i i
y
y
i i i
y y
y
LogL H H
H H H
δ δ ρ
δ δ ρ δ
=
=
= =
=
= Φ +
+ Φ − − + −Φ
∑
∑ ∑  
(11)
 
Finally, to estimate the models (8) and (9) we restrict our sample to 
homeowners having outstanding mortgage payments and that purchased their 
dwelling after 1989. By applying the former restrictions we keep out of the sample 
households that have purchased their dwelling too long ago, have not needed a 
mortgage or have inherited the dwelling. Obviously, these households might never 
experience a mortgage default, therefore, they are not expected to follow the same 
choice rules that homeowners that are currently mortgage borrowers. By 
considering these households in the sample the true relationship between income 
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uncertainty and the probability of homeownership might be “obscured”. Given that 
the necessary information to know whether a household is credit constrained or 
risk-averse is only available from 1995, to estimate our econometric model we pool 
the corresponding cross-sections for 1995, 1998 and 2000. In order to avoid 
inefficiency we just take the last wave the household has participated. 
 
4. Econometric results 
 Table 6 and 7 report the econometric estimation of the probability of 
homeownership. Table 6 focuses on the univariate and bivariate probit estimates to 
evaluate the effect of labor income uncertainty and credit constraints on the 
probability of homeownership (equation 8). Recall that given the nonlinear nature 
of the univariate and bivariate probit models, the estimated coefficients lack any 
economic interpretation and are just used to determine the sign of the relationship. 
However, at this stage this is just what we are interested in. 
 The credit constraint equation in the bivariate probit model is included to avoid 
the inconsistency of the parameters in the homeownership equation. It is worth 
noting that correlation between both equations turns out to be highly significant 
( 0ρ ≠ ), which means that controlling for this correlation is critical. Households 
with older household heads and with more dependent members have higher 
propensity to be credit constrained. Household income, education of the household 
head and his/her self-employment status exerts a negative effect on such a 
propensity. This equation also includes a set of dummy variables collecting the 
effect of the outstanding bank debts for the purchase of different goods. We find 
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this set of variables to be more important on wealth constraints than on income 
constraints. 
Our main findings concern the owner-occupancy equation. Consider first the 
role of the credit constraints. Consistent with the previous evidence, we find that in 
Italy both wealth constraints (WC) and income constraints (IC) exert a significant 
and negative effect on the probability of homeownership, though with a remarkably 
larger effect of the wealth constraints. The former result coincides with what was 
observed in the US5. Note that our proxy of credit constraints (DCC) based on 
direct questions shows also a significant and negative effect. The estimates coming 
from the bivariate probit model also confirm that the credit constraint parameters in 
the homeownership equation are quite sensible to the omission of the endogenous 
nature of the household’s credit constraints propensities. We find a significant 
downwards bias in the credit constraints parameters coming from the univariate 
probit model, -0.38 vs. -0.78 for income constraints (models 1 and 2, table 6) and –
3.33 vs. –4.03 for wealth constraints (models 3 and 4, table 6).  
Turning our attention to the effect of income uncertainty on homeownership, 
consistent with the previous empirical evidence for the US, Germany and Spain, 
we also observe a significant and negative effect in Italy. Other differences across 
models are observed in the effect of other variables considered in the owner-
occupancy equation, but the signs persistently remain in all models. Owner-
                                                 
5 We have also carried out a number of alternative specifications. In models where income and 
wealth constraints are simultaneously considered, income constraints have turned out to be 
statistically insignificant. Therefore, the effect of wealth constraints dominates over income 
constraints. Alternatively, we have also estimated a trivariate probit model using the simulated 
maximum likelihood method that simultaneously estimates the probability of homeownership and 
the wealth and income constraints propensities, and once more we observe that the wealth 
constraints effect dominates over the income constraints effect.  
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occupancy is more likely in smaller cities (less than 500,000 inhabitants), and out 
of the city center and in isolated areas. As expected, household head age, family 
income and being married raise the propensity to own, whereas household size and 
education exert a negative effect. This counter intuitive result contrasts with the 
observed in Spain, but coincides with previous evidence for Germany (see Diaz-
Serrano, 2004). 
 
Insert table 6 around here 
 
Turning to our major findings, we focus now on the estimates of the effect of 
income uncertainty on the probability of homeownership shown in table 7. Recall 
that this estimates comes from the system of equations (9). Although all models in 
table 7 include the same explanatory variables (except credit constraints in the 
homeownership equation) than the estimates reported in table 6, for the sake of 
simplicity we focus on the estimated parameters and effects associated to labor 
income uncertainty in the homeownership equation. To facilitate interpretation and 
the comparison between alternative models we also report the average marginal 
effects (APE). The single effect of labor income uncertainty in the homeownership 
equation can be computed as in the univariate probit as 22 2 2 2 2( )i i iHφ δ σ π π+ ⋅ , 
where φ is the standard normal density and π2 is the parameter associated to the 
labor income uncertainty (Christofides et al., 1997). 
We have estimated the APE for different population groups depending on 
whether they are or not credit constrained, and whether they are or not risk averse. 
 21
These results are crucial to determine the nature of the negative relationship 
between homeownership and labor income uncertainty. First at all, we shall remark 
that the high statistical significance of the correlation terms suggests that 
controlling for sample selection is critical to obtain unbiased estimates.  
Differences in the APE of labor income uncertainty between credit and non-
credit constrained are fairly modest, -0.067 vs. -0.078 for wealth (un)constrained, 
respectively, and –0.289 vs. -0.236  for income (un)constrained, respectively. 
Major differences in this negative relationship are reported when considering risk-
averse vs. non risk-averse households, -0.319 vs. –0.041, respectively. For the risk 
averse, a 10 percent increase in the average labor income uncertainty decreases 
about -3.25% the probability of being homeowner, whereas for the non-risk averse 
this effect has turned out to be statistically insignificant. For income 
(un)constrained households these percentages are –2.95% vs. –2.41%, respectively, 
and –0.68% vs. –0.80% for wealth (un)constrained households. These results 
suggest that the negative link between income uncertainty and the homeownership 
propensities is driven by risk-aversion.  
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
 In this paper we have investigated the effect of labor income uncertainty and 
credit constraints on the probability of homeownership in Italy. Consistent with the 
previous empirical evidence, we find that in Italy credit constrained households and 
with more volatile incomes are less likely to own their dwelling. As in the US, we 
also observe that although both types of constraints are important, the wealth 
constraints effect dominates over the income constraints effect.  
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 As the main focus of this paper we have investigated for the first time the 
underlying nature in the negative link between labor income uncertainty and 
homeownership. To carry out the test we have performed reduced form estimates 
using the bivariate probit model with sample selection. We observe that the gap in 
the estimated negative effect of income uncertainty on homeownership between 
credit and non-credit constrained households is immaterial. However, a markedly 
larger gap is found between risk and non-risk averse households, and being indeed 
statistically insignificant for the non-risk averse. These results indicate that the 
negative effect of income uncertainty on the homeownership propensities is driven 
by household’s risk aversion. 
 The corollary of our results suggests that institutions and the banking industry 
should devote greater efforts to promote homeownership among those households 
most at income risk. Probably, more efficient mortgage protection payment 
insurance policies should be designed in order to mitigate the devastating effect of 
income uncertainty on the homeownership propensities of the more risk-averse 
households. We find this is an important issue that still is under-researched. 
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Table 1: Estimation of the house preferred value according to equation (5), and of the labor 
income equation (6) 
 
Preferred House value 
(OLS) 
Household head annual earnings
(Panel with random effects) 
 Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant term 35,051.76 4.71 9.5336 616.82
Household income 1.4316 43.41  
Household income squared -1.1⋅10-6 -17.10  
Number of children 7,154.77 7.74  
Household head characteristics   
Age 1,477.85 3.47  
Age squared -9.8867 -2.55  
Married 1,924.12 0.75  
Female -914.15 -0.41 -0.2905 -53.25
Years of schooling 0.0562 84.40
Experience 0.0150 25.98
Experience squared -0.0002 -36.24
Region (base North-West)      
North-East 13,192.68 5.47 -0.0463 -6.64
Centre 4,387.64 1.79 -0.0909 -14.08
South 9,900.65 3.71 -0.1770 -27.71
Islands 12,563.72 3.23 -0.1803 -23.00
City size (base <20,000)      
20,000 to 40,000 -4,556.10 5.15 0.0386 5.69
40,000 to 500,000 -12,030.17 6.59 0.0748 13.12
More than 500,000 -20,683.19 3.12 0.1077 13.59
Relative cost of owning 15.1233 3.85 0.0386 5.69
Year dummies      Yes   
F-test 239  
Wald test  29,064 
ρ    0,369 
R-squared 0,461   0,364 
Sample size 4,766 59,065 
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Table 2:  Sample means for borrowing constraints variables  
 
Wealth Constrained 
(WC) 
Income Constrained 
(IC) 
Direct answers  
 (DCC) 
 full renter owner full renter owner full renter owner
Total 0.243 0.792 0.014 0.378 0.514 0.321 0.091 0.154 0.063
Household head age            
Up to 30 0.441 0.831 0.008 0.362 0.479 0.231 0.087 0.128 0.054
31-40 0.316 0.767 0.009 0.324 0.436 0.247 0.078 0.128 0.048
41-50 0.228 0.744 0.006 0.303 0.441 0.244 0.099 0.182 0.064
51-65 0.177 0.766 0.009 0.331 0.481 0.288 0.085 0.127 0.074
more than 65 0.249 0.870 0.029 0.526 0.699 0.464 0.139 0.353 0.073
Region            
North-West 0.262 0.785 0.003 0.250 0.388 0.181 0.030 0.138 0.073
North-East 0.215 0.794 0.011 0.326 0.487 0.269 0.029 0.143 0.060
Centre 0.214 0.756 0.006 0.316 0.438 0.269 0.052 0.096 0.066
South 0.266 0.830 0.026 0.527 0.668 0.468 0.124 0.237 0.152
Islands 0.254 0.790 0.035 0.574 0.701 0.522 0.081 0.222 0.124
City size            
Up to 20,000 0.208 0.807 0.022 0.475 0.594 0.438 0.078 0.234 0.114
20,000 to 40,000 0.221 0.775 0.010 0.395 0.540 0.341 0.085 0.154 0.105
40,000 to 500,000 0.261 0.801 0.012 0.336 0.499 0.261 0.047 0.121 0.070
more than 500,000 0.298 0.762 0.004 0.258 0.403 0.165 0.048 0.169 0.101
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Table 3:  Sample means for labor income uncertainty 
 Full sample Renter Owner 
Total 0.264 0.373 0.263 
Household head age    
Up to 30 0.398 0.416 0.327 
31-40 0.258 0.290 0.249 
41-50 0.230 0.348 0.228 
51-65 0.292 0.422 0.290 
more than 65 0.279 0.429 0.274 
Household head characteristics  
Married 0.260 0.396 0.258 
Not married 0.284 0.283 0.285 
Self-employed 0.450 0.552 0.228 
Not self-employed 0.230 0.345 0.373 
Unemployed 0.326 0.461 0.230 
Not unemployed 0.261 0.373 0.260 
Region    
North-West 0.246 0.362 0.228 
North-East 0.272 0.295 0.271 
Centre 0.245 0.258 0.229 
South 0.260 0.427 0.254 
Islands 0.330 0.777 0.322 
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Table 4: Sample statistics for risk aversion 
1995  2000 
     N    %     N     % 
Answered the question 5,814 71,5  3,193 81.2 
Did not answer the question  2,321 28,5  740 18.8 
Total   respondents 8,135   3,933  
Risk Averse (P<2,600€)  76.5   92.4 
Risk Neutral (P=2,600€)  16.9   6.8 
Risk Lovers (P>2,600€)  6.6   0.8 
Note: (1) Including all valid responses; (2) Including only positive responses. 
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Table 5: Performance tests for absolute risk aversion (ARA) 
 Investment in risky assets  Self-employment
 Probit(1)  GLM(2) Tobit(3)  Probit(4) 
 Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. z-value
Constant  -9.6460 -15.78 -15.7241 -14.63 -21.1653 -22.52 -3.4268 -8.77
ARA -1.3184 -6.08 -1.5738 -4.00 -2.2792 -5.86 -0.6981 -3.52
Log(income) 0.7114 12.53 1.0825 11.94 1.6544 20.32 0.1073 3.11
Age 0.0226 2.14 0.0620 2.21 0.0325 1.69 0.0863 7.77
Age squared -0.0002 -1.97 -0.0006 -2.14 -0.0003 -1.49 -0.0011 -9.71
Schooling 0.0687 10.37 0.0606 4.29 0.1074 8.80 -0.0019 -0.31
Female -0.1044 -1.94 -0.2232 -1.81 -0.2821 -2.51 -0.5254 -10.32
Region dummies 
(base North-West)     
North-East -0.0511 -0.95 -0.0840 -0.77 -0.1096 -1.11 0.1349 2.56
Centre -0.1820 -3.15 -0.4312 -3.26 -0.3405 -3.19 0.1004 1.89
South -0.5798 -8.49 -0.8940 -5.49 -0.9058 -6.92 0.0134 0.25
Islands -0.6862 -6.95 -0.9293 -3.11 -1.1740 -6.16 0.0303 0.45
1995 -0.1760 -3.98 -0.5357 -5.25 -0.3538 -4.27 0.0856 2.37
Sample size 8,414 
Note:  (1) Endogenous variable: Dummy takes 1 if the household has risky asset in the portfolio; (2) 
Endogenous variable: Percentage of investment in risky assets overall portfolio. In the generalized linear 
model I use a logit function on the endogenous variable; (3) Endogenous variable: Total amount invested 
in risky assets. Truncation point at 0; (4) Endogenous variable: Dummy takes one if the household head is 
self-employee. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the effect of labor income uncertainty and credit constraints on the probability of homeownership (univariate and bivariate probits). 
 
Univariate Probit
(Model 1) 
Bivariate Probit 
(Model 2) 
Univariate Probit
(Model 3) 
Bivariate Probit 
(Model 4) 
 Homeownership  Homeownership  IC  Homeownership  Homeownership  WC 
 Coeff. z-stat  Coeff. z-stat  Coeff. z-stat  Coeff. z-stat  Coeff. z-stat  Coeff. z-stat 
Constant term 1.3253 4.61 1.6403 5.88 2.0252 12.76 3.7505 9.07 4.1114 11.33 2.2036 7.74 
Age -0.0160 -1.86 -0.0188 -2.25 0.0158 8.64 -0.0503 -3.70 -0.0481 -4.06 0.0090 6.87 
Age squared 0.0001 1.11 0.0001 1.63   0.0004 3.21 0.0004 3.79   
Household size -0.1056 -5.25 -0.1069 -5.53   -0.1015 -3.65 -0.1136 -4.61   
Married 0.2942 6.04 0.2640 5.53   0.3137 4.18 0.2572 3.79   
Dependent      0.2617 10.80      -0.0124 -0.76 
Years of Schooling 0.0148 2.37 0.0087 1.47 -0.0349 -6.88 -0.0255 -3.01 -0.0340 -4.51 -0.0361 -6.02 
Self-employed 0.1738 3.36 0.1939 3.77 0.0960 1.24 -0.3650 -5.55 -0.4545 -7.04 -0.4621 -7.62 
Income uncertainty -0.5466 -5.55 -0.5239 -5.95  -0.2968 -2.73 -0.3123 -3.46   
Family income 1.2⋅10-5 7.04 9.3⋅10-6 5.91 -0.0001 -38.89 3.9⋅10-6 3.01 8.8⋅10-7 0.87 -2.3⋅10-5 -19.23 
Relative cost of owning -0.0005 -3.26 -0.0004 -2.67   -0.0003 -1.74 -0.0002 -1.34   
Location dummies (base-others)       
Isolated – countryside 0.2208 1.95 0.2294 2.07   0.0420 0.24   
Town outskirts -0.3659 -4.47 -0.3526 -4.37   -0.3660 -3.01   
Between outskirts and city center -0.3606 -4.39 -0.3312 -4.11   -0.3967 -3.29   
City center -0.4840 -5.71 -0.4489 -5.38   -0.5692 -4.62   
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City size (base < 500,000 inhab.) 
>500.000 inhab. -0.3676 -6.60 -0.3456 -6.34   -0.3328 -4.88   
Credit constraints                  
DCC (Direct answer from respondents) -0.4970 -4.43 -0.4917 -4.49   -0.4963 -3.10 -0.4476 -3.27   
IC (Income constrained) -0.3881 -5.93 -0.7887 -9.94          
WC (Wealth constrained)         -3.3366 -45.26 -4.0331 -51.64   
Outstanding bank debt dummies                  
Purchase of real goods      -0.1362 -0.22      0.2077 0.63 
Purchase of motor vehicles      -0.1321 -1.38      0.1401 2.35 
Purchase of furniture, electrical appliances      0.2601 2.17      0.2290 2.88 
Purchase of non-durable goods      0.2742 0.92      0.4807 2.96 
ρ   
Wald test H0:ρ=0   
0.4485 
  55.56 
0.7874 
   9.94 
Sample size 5,845 
Note: All the equations include year and regional dummies (20 regions). 
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Table 7: Estimates of the effect of labor income uncertainty on the probability of homeownership (bivariate probits with sample selection) 
 Bivariate probit with sample selection 
Coefficient z-value ρ APE
∆p(y2i=1) with 10% 
increase in 2ˆ iεσ Wald test H0:ρ=0 Sample size
Income constrained (IC)   
IC=1 -0.8081 -6.09 0.0450 -0.2894 -2.95% 1.16 5,845
IC=0 -0.5976 -6.44 -0.2362 -2.41% 1.16 5,845
Wealth constrained (WC)   
WC=1 -0.1678 -1.55 -0.9827 -0.0669 -0.68% 1115.67 5,845
WC=0 -0.1968 -3.53 -0.0785 -0.80% 1115.67 5,845
Risk and non risk averse     
Risk averse=1 -0.8029 -4.70 0.0910 -0.319 -3.25% 7.89 2,944
Risk averse=0 -0.1041 -0.35 -0.041 -0.42% 7.89 2,944
 
 
 
 
 
